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“I propose to consider the question, ‘Can machines think?’
This should begin with definitions of the meaning of the terms
‘machine’ and ‘think’. The definitions might be framed so as
to reflect so far as possible the normal use of the words, but
this attitude is dangerous”. With this proposal, Alan Turing
(1950) moves into the question, whether intelligence is bound
to neurons. It is remarkable that he begins his seminal work on
that, what today is so readily (and inappropriately) called ar-
tificial intelligence, with a fundamental definition of terminol-
ogy. He makes a very important point: the attitude to frame
definitions on the “normal use of words”, i.e., to give a new
and different meaning to terms that are in everyday use al-
ready, is “dangerous”. Indeed. A debate, where terms are am-
biguous, will turn ambiguous. This primordial fallacy might
contribute a big deal to the controversy about so-called plant
consciousness. This debate is overlapping, but not identical to
the controversy, whether plants can feel pain, which was
thematised in the editorial to the preceding issue (Nick
2021) reflecting on the contributions by Robinson et al.
(2021) and Baluška and Yokawa (2021). The question, wheth-
er plants can feel pain, and the question, whether plants are
endowed with consciousness, seem to be of a similar logical
structure. Plants are obviously quite different from us. Can we
assume that consciousness, a phenomenon, which is even hard
to interpret in ourselves, exists in plants, but in a form that is so
different that we cannot easily recognise it as similar? Or does
the fact that we cannot recognise this phenomenon in plants
without inferring numerous auxiliary assumptions, not simply
mean that this phenomenon does not have a counterpart in
plants? Again, the old debate about homology versus conver-
gence. To dissect this may be rewarding, irrespective of the
outcome, because it brings clarity and advances our
understanding of the world and of ourselves. However, the
debate has suffered from terminological ambiguity from the
very beginning—giving a good example for Turing’s dictum.
Keeping this principal problem in mind, it is worth reading
two contributions to the current issue addressing the topic of
plant consciousness from two opposed viewpoints—Mallatt
et al. (2021) take a clear stand against, while Trewavas (2021)
is a proponent in favour of plant consciousness.
In their contribution, Mallatt et al. (2021) work systemati-
cally through a list of twelve claims. Before doing so, they first
try to define their object by drawing a line between something
they call “higher consciousness” and “phenomenal” or “pri-
mary” consciousness. “Higher consciousness” describes a
phenomenon characterised by traits linked with personality,
such as the ability to reflect on experiences, recognise the own
self in a mirror, or ponder a thought. They concede that also
their opponents do not claim that plants are endowed with
higher consciousness (which seems to be linked with lan-
guage). This is not the debate—the debate is about presence
of “primary consciousness”, which describes that a living be-
ing has “a first-person point of view”. The authors break this
relatively vague definition down into two operational criteria.
There is a mental representation of the sensed world, and there
is affective judgement of situations as “good” or “bad”. They
quote then, interestingly, a definition from their opponent,
defining primary consciousness “as the capacities to be aware
of the environment and to integrate sensory information for
purposeful organismal behavior” (Trewavas et al. 2020), and
they agree with this definition, specifying that aware is
transcending the realm of mere mechanistic responses to a
stimulus and that purpose is transcending evolutionary adap-
tation in the sense that it is a kind of individual volition.
Having defined what they mean by consciousness, they are
setting forth to “debunk” that primary consciousness exists in
plants. Rather than listing these twelve arguments individual-
ly, I will try to group them into logical units:
Stimulus-response versus consciousness All living organisms
are endowed with the ability to perceive and respond to
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signals from the environment, and this ability has been central
to survival. This fact is not disputed by anybody, but it does
not mean that this perception and response is a manifestation
of consciousness. The authors work this out using the Cellular
Basis of Consciousness Theory (Reber 2016) as example.
Arguments against a plant neurobiology Plant cells share with
animal cells (as with all other cells) the ability to generate mem-
brane voltage and can under certain circumstances (albeit in
very specific cells in very specific plants) even generate action
potentials. The existence of a vascular system that not only can
transport water and assimilates but also signals has been used to
draw an analogy with neurons. However, whether a phenome-
non is a signal or a by-phenomenon depends on its “meaning”,
i.e., on the question, whether this phenomenon is really used to
transmit information. This question remains untouched by the
notion that such signals can be emitted from specific sites in the
plant (in this context, often the root cap is described as a brain-
like structure). It also remains untouched by the question,
whether these signals are electrical or chemical. It just should
be mentioned in this context that the path of research that led to
the discovery of the phytohormone auxin was a similar signal
transmission phenomenon from the tip of the irradiated coleop-
tile to the base of this organ, where growth responds to this
signal. Several “debunking” arguments deal with the question
to what extent the electric phenomena in plants are homologous
with their neural counterpart. The (negative) outcome of this
investigation tells that they are not. The phloem and neurons are
not even convergent structures. The neurons might just be met-
aphors for signalling in plants (in a way that is quite similar,
“neural networks” are described to describe “learning” in arti-
ficial intelligence; see at the end of this editorial).
Plants can anticipate The adaptation of plants, not only on an
evolutionary scale but also as adapting individuals, is impres-
sive. For instance, root systems can forage limited re-
sources (such as sulphur or phosphorous), and this, at
first sight, looks like intelligent, anticipative behaviour.
However, as efficient as such responses may be, they
are not proof of anticipative behaviour, but can be ex-
plained by local responses (increased lateral root forma-
tion in response to phosphorous depletion, for instance)
and mutua l compet i t ion of la te ra l o rgans for
limited resources leading to pattern formation. It was
Alan Turing, by the way, who could demonstrate, how
simple and local processes (that are indeterminate with
respect to the individual outcome, but hard-wired with
respect to their mechanism) can generate complex, ro-
bust, adaptive, and holistic patterns (Turing 1952). To
make this clear, what the authors understand as
anticipative behaviour, they describe experiments with
spiders and contrast those with experiments on strawber-
ry ramets.
The authors conclude with a delineation between con-
sciousness and learning and point out that learning can be
achieved without consciousness. This point is relevant.
Operationally, “learning” means that the response to a stimu-
lus depends on stimuli that had been perceived earlier. This is
also possible on the base of a stimulus-response machinery,
any training of a so-called “neural network” can serve as ev-
idence for this. In the attempt to operationalise “conscious-
ness”, they come up with two criteria. The one is so-called
high-capacity operant learning, by which they mean “learning
a brand new behaviour that uses one’s whole body”, and the
second is image-based consciousness. They locate these (rath-
er tight) criteria in vertebrates, cephalopods, and certain ar-
thropods and find as common theme that all these life forms
are highly mobile (although they also state that their criteria
per se are not bound to mobility). Interestingly, they also
conclude that primary consciousness in these three groups of
animals has evolved independently, meaning that it is a
convergence.
The contribution of Trewavas (2021) can be read as a re-
sponse, but it also tries to operationalise and to define nomencla-
ture. The author begins with a short remark in favour of plant
neurobiology referring to the historical work by Sir Bose on
electrical phenomena in plants (Bose 1926), but does not dwell
on this point, but instead goes on to discuss the more difficult
problem of consciousness searching for a way to treat this inde-
pendently of the question, whether plants have something like a
neural system. He first introduces a terminological clarification,
replacing the term “consciousness” by the term of “awareness”
(which would correspond to the concept of “primary conscious-
ness” mentioned above). One important argument is that “con-
sciousness” is bound to language, and if you cannot ask some-
body, it is not possible to decide from outside, whether “con-
sciousness” is present or not. For this operational reason, he also
suggests that the behaviour of non-verbal animals should not be
described by the same term used for human consciousness.
As central aspect to define “awareness”, the author sees the
ability to assess (he uses the term appraisal) the imprint of the
detected external or internal signals. This is a criterion where
he is congruent with the definition by Mallatt et al. (2021),
where both sides disagree the question, whether such an “ap-
praisal” exists in plants, or whether plants respond merely by a
stimulus-response machinery. In support of his case,
Trewavas (2021) lists a couple of examples, where the re-
sponse to a given stimulus depends on absence of presence
of other stimuli, which is taken as evidence for associative
learning. This statement should be questioned, however. In
fact, there are numerous cases, where signalling is cross-
connecting. However, at least for some of those listed in this
context, for instance, the modulation of phototropism (trig-
gered by blue light) by preceding irradiation with red light,
mechanistic, “stimulus-response” explanations have been pro-
posed. Those imply, for instance, changes of receptor
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abundance and activity (so-called sensory adaptation), or
time-dependent limitations in signal transduction (so-called
habituation). He makes then an important point: any type of
learning is a process with a temporal dimension—temporal
contiguity is needed for conditioning. Likewise, associative
learning is based on contingency between two stimuli.
However, as explained by Mallatt et al. (2021), associative
learning does not require consciousness, but can also proceed
in a stimulus-response framework, as long as the relationships
are adaptable, i.e., prone to temporal change depending on the
input. We have spelled this out recently addressing the senso-
ry role of microtubules during cold acclimation (Wang et al.
2020). In a short interlude, the author summarises the argu-
ments to discuss “awareness” and avoid the term “conscious-
ness”. He proposes then the use of Integrated Information
Theory (Tononi 2004) as a tool to operationalise “awareness”,
mainly with the argument that it is “blind to any requirement
for brains, nerves, and synapses” (in other words, he separates
the plant neurobiology debate from the plant awareness de-
bate, which is certainly meaningful). As central criterion, he
emphasises the existence of information loops, where input is
not just generating a stereotypic output, but where signalling is
feeding back to input. Although originally coined to describe
the recurrent signalling in the human brain, this viewpoint
(which is, in fact, a resurrection of cybernetics) can also be
used to describe other complex behaviours of adapting sys-
tems. The information content Φmax of such a network in-
creases with the density of loops and connections and repre-
sents something like a holistic memory of the system. As to
transcend the level of loops and interactions, one needs an
entity where the history of dynamic interactions of such a
system is stored. In humans, we assign this function to the
brain. But what about plants, where all the time cells are gen-
erated and consumed? There are cells that remain active
throughout the life cycle of the plant and give rise to all other
cells in the plant bodies—these are the meristems. The author
proposes that they are the physical seat of Φmax, for instance,
by virtue of a contiguous extracellular matrix or by a complex
and dynamic system of calcium signalling. He concludes with
a metaphor of cars driven either by fossil fuel or by electricity
alluding to the different lifestyles of animals (responding by
movement) and plants (responding by growth and develop-
ment, i.e., on a different time scale).
It is always a challenge for editorial neutrality to describe
a debate as controversial as this, and it may be helpful to
take a little detour, looking at the seemingly different, but
related phenomenon of so-called “artificial intelligence”.
This technological advance is progressively entering our
everyday experience and inspires both awe and fascination,
because it is somehow behaving “like us”, but on the other
side remains “deeply alien” to us. On the operational level,
“artificial intelligence” works with so-called “neural net-
works”. Ironically, these systems are neither neural nor
have they been developed to explain neural systems.
McCulloch and Pitts (1943) used the metaphor of neural
learning to describe self-learning systems. In principle, such
systems consist of three layers of interactors, where input
(“stimulus”) and output (“response”) are coupled by a cen-
tral layer that can interconnect with flexible permeability.
This permeability depends on both input and output. Using
a training data set as input and a feedback that will minimise
the difference between input and output, a system is created
that “learns” to reproduce and respond appropriately to a
given set of inputs. If the number of elements is increased,
the complexity and efficiency of such systems can be im-
pressive and, in some aspect, even overwhelm human ca-
pacities. In other words, Φmax can, however only in the
trained context, exceed our own Φmax. But would we assign
to such an “artificial intelligence” any “awareness”? This is
to be doubted. Will a description of plant behaviour (or the
behaviour of any other life form) by Integrated Information
Theory really help us to grasp the essence of “awareness”?
It is a peculiar trait of this debate that the number of review
articles vastly exceeds the number of research papers on this
matter. To render this debate more fruitful, it should be fed
with real-world experiments. To compile experiments con-
ducted in a different context to address different questions will
not suffice. Instead, experiments have to be specifically de-
signed for the purpose to verify or to disprove implications
derived from such operationalisations as developed in the two
contributions by Mallatt et al. (2021) and Trewavas (2021). It
may be fruitful to separate the controversy about “plant neu-
robiology” from the debate about plant intelligence or aware-
ness. It may also be fruitful to develop operationalisations that
are on the one hand, appropriate, and on the other hand draw a
clear line between a stimulus-response (which can be complex
and adaptable) mechanism and “appraisal”. To address his
initial questions, whether “machines can think”, Turing ar-
rived at an interesting test, called imitation game. The core
of this game is that the experimentator looks at the system,
whose “ability to think” is to be assessed, as a black box, and
simply asks questions to this system “as if it were” able to
think. By skillful questioning, the performance of the black
box is compared to that of a true thinker. Rather than recycling
the same arguments again and again, it would be worth to
develop a non-verbal Turing Test; in other words, we need a
Turing Test for plants.
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